Abstract
Bolivia is located in the centre of South America, enclosed by five neighbour countries; it has no direct access to the Oceans. In the last decade, Bolivia had engaged in a campaign to persuade Peru and Brasil to jointly build a high speed railway between the Port of Santos in Brasil and Ilo in Peru. After the failed attempt to force Chile to negotiate a solution for Bolivia’s landlocked situation, this bi-oceanic corridor would be Bolivia’s best viable access to the oceans and global markets. After initial negotiations, the governments of Peru, Bolivia, Brasil and Paraguay commissioned feasibility studies and the most likely traces were eventually delineated. The costs for the project have been estimated to reach initially 14 billion dollars and would come from mixed sources. A consortium of many Swiss and German companies and the German government have been assigned roles for design services and technical assistance. The transcontinental railway, its construction, maintenance and related services and benefits will boost the competitiveness of the countries in the region. Only Brazil expects to transport 40 million Tons per year. The necessary time to connect the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean will be 37% faster than through the Panama Canal (42 instead of 67 days avg.). Therefore, the corridor is considered as a Panama Canal of the 21st century and is thought not only to benefit the host nations but also the trade between Europe and Asia. The Bolivian section will extend 1521 km. However, the area of impact could be more than 300000 square km, about 28% of the surface of the entire country, in which 3/4 of the population live. The corridor will have a direct influence into the most dynamic axis of the country. It will probably attract a considerable percentage of citizens from other remote rural and urban areas. That means, its influence will be a challenge for urban growth on the one side and population decline on the other side. This is an extraordinarily important challenge for the strategic regional planning of both. Opportunities need to be used and risks minimized. Beyond the access to global markets, the corridor would also articulate a new strategic element, which is the railway and waterway connectivity to the centre of the continent in Puerto Busch, Bolivia. This is the centre point between Bolivia and Paraguay (both landlocked countries) and Brazil, the largest market in the region. The author considers that Puerto Busch may potentially turn into a major hub for regional logistics. This is becoming particularly interesting as the weaknesses of the vulnerable globalized market have been unveiled after the trade war between the Western World and Asia in 2019 and more certainly looking at the current global impact of the pandemic of SARS-CoV-2. Large companies in western economies have started re-shoring their highly fragmented global supply chains, and strategic sites like Puerto Busch will become decisive as regional alternatives for supply chains arise. Will we be able to learn from and lead the evident risks of the globalized trade we have been running so far? What are the chances for the hinterlands in emerging economies? This paper discusses these issues from the perspective of regional planning and suggests alternatives for a new “regional glocalization”.
